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Abstract—VANET security introduces significant processing
overhead for resource-constrained On-Board Units (OBUs). Here,
we propose a novel scheme that allows secure Vehicular Com-
munication (VC) systems to scale well beyond network densities
for which existing optimization approaches could be workable,
without compromising security (and privacy).
Index Terms—Security, performance, scalability
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, notably Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) commu-
nication, entail high-rate transmissions; typically, for safety
applications, On-Board Units (OBUs) transmit at a rate of
10 messages (safety beacons) per second. Granted, there are
methods that adapt the beaconing rate, but the challenge
is clear: often, especially as VC systems get progressively
widely deployed, each vehicle will have to process safety
beacons, along with other traffic, from several tens of other
vehicles within its OBU range. For example, 200 (300) mes-
sages/second for 20 (30) neighboring vehicles.
The provision of security and privacy protection aggra-
vates the situation, adding communication overhead (digital
signatures and certificates attached, thus longer messages) as
well as computational overhead (digital signature verifications
mostly, and signature calculations). This problem has been
investigated in the literature, with a number of improvements
(e.g., [3], [5]) compatible with the standardized pseudonymous
authentication approach. For example, the certificates of the
authenticating sender can be omitted periodically or based on
the sender’s context [5]; at the receiver side, they need to be
validated once [3].
These approaches provide significant improvements and
show how one can dimension processing power [3], but they
are somewhat conservative: they assume each node validates
all received messages it receives and deems relevant. Indeed,
this is the straightforward approach. An alternative, adaptive,
reactive approach has been considered in [10], but only for
multi-hop messages.
It is important to realize that for safety beacon transmitted,
there are N validations that take place; where N is the number
of receiving neighbors. This is significant redundant effort,
especially when most of the transmissions, termed Cooperative
Awareness Messages (CAMs), are important yet not of high
priority. Intuitively, if most nodes (vehicles) are benign, each
validation of a message they perform could serve their peers
in the vicinity.
This is exactly the idea we promote in this short paper: Each
node can notify its neighbors about its successful verification
of some recently received beacons; each neighbor that vali-
dates such an augmented message can leverage this additional
information and avoid verifying itself the corresponding bea-
cons. Ideally, this could reduce significantly the overhead, as
one costly cryptographic verification provides information for
multiple messages. But this is a double-edged sword: if not
done carefully, it leaves space for abuse by intelligent internal
adversaries.
Our results show that the network density, which raises the
scalability problem, can also provide a remedy. Our scheme
trades a tiny window of vulnerability, allowing a miniscule
fraction of beacons that could be mistaken as valid before
an adversarial node be evicted.1 At the same time, we get
extensive improvement in terms of message validation delay,
allowing, in fact, the network to scale to neighborhoods that
are 50% to 100% larger than the ones for which optimized
yet more conservative approaches would be saturated and
unworkable.
In the rest of the paper, we present in detail our cooperative
validation scheme (Sec. II), we provide a security analysis
(Sec. III), and present a body of simulation results (Sec. IV)
before some concluding remarks (Sec. V).
II. OUR SCHEME
Overview: Our scheme extends the traditional V2V mes-
sage verification, leveraging neighboring peers to reduce vali-
dation delays without compromising the achieved security (and
privacy). The basic idea is to augment each (safety) message
with brief identifiers of previously validated messages. These
identifiers indicate the corresponding messages have been
verified by the sender. This is exactly where nodes can benefit
from each other: accepting a message can help verifying the
messages (received and queued) the identifiers in this message
point to. In addition, to counter misbehavior, each node
probabilistically selects a subset of the received identifiers and
verifies by itself the signatures of the corresponding messages.
Revocation would be triggered if any misbehavior is identified.
Table I summarizes notation used in this paper.
1We emphasize that if a message is critical, the receiver can always validate
it in a traditional way, in addition to our optimistic approach.
TABLE I: Notation
N Number of vehicles
{msg}σ Signed message
Prcheck Probability of checking each peer-provided verification result
α Number of verification results in a CAM
γ CAM frequency
τ Average message verification delay
H()/H Hash function/Hash value
b 1 bit value, indicating the message is selected for checking
Message Generation and Reception: The format of a
signed CAM in our scheme is changed into:
{M}σ = {CAM Fields,H1..Hα}σ. (1)
Except the hashes, H1..Hα, we assume the rest of the fields
are as defined in the standard [4]. H1..Hα are the hashes of
latest verified CAMs (based on the timestamps of the CAMs,
not the times of reception or verification). For example, a
vehicle, V , caches locally the hash values of the latest verified
CAMs (for which V performed signature verifications, not
cooperatively verified as described below) and includes them
in its own (sent) CAMs.
Everytime a node receives a CAM, it generates a job based
on the CAM. Here, we consider the processing of a received
CAM as a job. The format of the job is defined as follows:
{{M}σ, H({M}σ), b = 0 or 1}. (2)
The field b indicates the CAMs are selected for probabilistic
checking. In case b is set to 1 for a job, the corresponding
CAM cannot be verified through cooperative verification (peer-
provided hashes): the signature of this CAM must be verified.
For each new job, b is set to 0.
We assume a single thread for cryptographic verification in
each OBU: a CAM received when the thread is busy needs
to be queued. To increase efficiency, we randomly select the
inserted position in the queue for each new job. This way, we
reduce the probability that nearby receivers verify the same
CAM roughly simultaneously. The verification of CAMs that
sent from a node does not need to follow the sending order,
as long as they are verified before they expire.
Cooperative Verification: Queue processing at a node is
done according to Algorithm 1. When the queue is not empty,
the node pops the first job from the queue, and accepts the
CAM if the signature is valid. The hashes, H1..Hα, are used
to verify the CAMs (for which b = 0) in the queue. For each
cooperatively verified CAM, there is a probability Prcheck,
that the CAM will be checked by validating the signature. If
so, b is set to 1 and it is inserted after the last job with b = 1
(i.e., before the first job that b = 0). Otherwise, the CAM is
accepted and removed from the queue.
The probabilistic checking of the claimed verifications
(hashes) counters abuse, due to (i) the density of the neigh-
borhood and the (extensive, most often) majority of benign
nodes present, and (ii) the ability to locally contain/ignore
misbehaving nodes and then globally evict them. The latter is
easily enabled by our scheme (simple cryptographic validation
in lieu of misbehavior detection), yet the exact way to identify
locally the wrongdoer and evict it is orthogonal and can be
done by schemes proposed in the literature, e.g., [8].
Algorithm 1 Cooperative verification
1: while Queue is not empty do
2: Pop a job, {{M}σ ,H, b}, from the head of Queue
3: M = {CAM Fields,H1..Hα}
4: if The signature of {M}σ is valid then
5: Accept M
6: for Each Hi in H1..Hα of M do
7: if Hi is found in Queue, and b of Mi is 0 then
8: Chooses 1 with probability Prcheck,
9: or 0 with probability 1− Prcheck
10: if Chooses 1 then
11: Insert {{M}σ ,H(M), b = 1} into Queue,
12: right after the last job, for which b is 1
13: else
14: Accept Mi,
15: and remove {{Mi}σ,Hi, b} from Queue
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end if
20: end while
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Adversary Model: We consider internal adversaries seek-
ing to abuse the system, in particular the cooperative veri-
fication scheme. Without loss of generality, let an adversary
controlling one OBU injecting bogus, i.e., not properly signed
messages. Then, let the adversary use a compromised OBU
(equipped with the appropriate credentials) that transmits
augmented messages falsely claiming previously transmitted
bogus messages as verified. In the hope that those bogus
messages received by benign nodes would be accepted without
verification/checking. Such adversarial behavior is actually
relevant to the optimistic cooperative validation approach we
advocate here. An attacker could try to generate malicious
CAMs given overheard hashes. However, given the properties
of hash functions and the length of hash values (80 bit, as
considered in Sec. IV), it is very straightforward that finding
a message based on the hash values is very hard.
Analysis: Next, we discuss exactly how this misbehavior,
specific to our scheme, is countered. We emphasize we are
not concerned here with the validity of the message content,
e.g., the correctness of a location or an alert about emer-
gency braking; those are orthogonal and can be addressed
by relevant consistency checking ([6], [7]) and data-centric
security schemes [9]. Here, we are concerned with incorrectly
signed (with arbitrary content) messages, and the attempt to
legitimize them by improper, adversarial use of our scheme.
The detection of any such false claim is straightforward for any
legitimate receiver, as long as it cryptographically validates the
purported as verified message (signature).
The use of pseudonymous authentication, as per the stan-
dards under development, guarantees non-repudiation and
message integrity and authentication; as long as the receiving
node performs the cryptographic validation itself (message
signature and attached pseudonym validation).
Revealing False Claims: To increase the probability of
detecting such misbehaviors, the reasonable amount of peer-
provided verification results should be checked. However,
cooperation among nodes within a neighborhood could sig-
nificantly increase this probability.
Consider a single adversary case, transmitting messages
at a rate γadv. In the worst case (broadcasting aggressively
bogus messages, hoping benign nodes receive as many bogus
messages as possible), the adversary could broadcast bogus
messages at a rate α
α+1
· γadv and broadcast valid messages
that “validate” those bogus messages at a rate 1
α+1
·γadv. More
specifically, broadcast α bogus messages and broadcast the
(α+ 1)-th, as a valid one that includes hashes of the earlier α
bogus messages. We seek to detect the adversary that provided
such faulty claims and revoke its credentials. For any message,
the probability of all α included hashes not being checked by
a receiver is:
Prskip = (1− Prcheck)
α. (3)
Then, assuming v votes (misbehavior reports) are needed to
cooperatively reveal a misbehavior, the probability of revealing
such a message with N benign nodes in the neighborhood (as-
suming they have all received the bogus “validating” message)
can be estimated as:
Prreveal = 1−
v−1∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(Prskip)
N−i(1 − Prskip)
i, (4)
where Prskip is calculated with Eq. (3). Prreveal increases
with neighbor density; high neighbor density (thus, high
message reception rate) environments are the ones our scheme
fits best. Note that Prreveal is only the probability of revealing
a single malicious message. The probability of revealing
misbehavior after n malicious messages are sent out would
be even higher: 1− (1− Prreveal)
n.
For example, Prreveal is around 0.80 in a network with
α = 5, N = 15, Prcheck = 0.1 and v = 5. This means
the adversary would be revealed with high probability even
after its first transmission of a false claim. A more intelligent
adversary could include only a reduced number of bogus
message hashes in each valid CAM, to reduce the probability
of getting detected. However, this significantly weakens the
adversary, which would still get revealed after several rounds.
Benign receivers may consume only a few bogus messages
for the short period, causing minimal harm while ensuring
integrity and authentication of the vast majority of messages
in an efficient way; considering most of the CAMs are sent out
with low priority in a usual environment. In addition, a node
can choose to verify the CAMs sent out with high priority
immediately, ignoring the queue size and our cooperative
verification protocol.
Privacy: On top of security, we note that privacy is not
weakened by our scheme. The hash values in a CAM do not
link transmissions of any other node, beyond what one can
infer from geographical information included in the CAMs.
IV. EVALUATION
We use OMNeT++ [1] and the IEEE 802.11p module from
Veins [2] to simulate our scheme and analyze the system
performance. Let waiting time be the total time a received
message waits in the queue before its verification. Our scheme
achieves low delays, which would not have been possible for
the standard approach (First-Come First-Served with verifica-
tion of all messages, referred next as baseline).
TABLE II: System Parameters (Bold for Default Setting)
N 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
Prcheck 0.2, 0.4, 0.6
α 3, 4, 5, 6
τ 3, 5, 7 ms
γ 10 Hz
Simulation Settings: Table II shows the system parameters
and values used in the simulation. We consider a 200 m ×
200 m square area. The node we evaluate is placed at the
center of the area and its neighbors (the rest of the nodes) are
uniformly placed in the area. We consider a bit rate of 6Mbps,
with 300 bytes length for each CAM (including a signature
and a certificate). In addition, we increase the payload length
based on the number of hashes (80 bit for each) included,
thus communication overhead of 80 · α bits. This amounts to
extra communication delay in the order of 0.1 ms per CAM,
considering the values we use for α. Certificate omission [3]
can be used to decrease message verification delay. However,
we do not explicitly address it in our simulation; rather, we
assume the message verification delay, on average, has a
deterministic value τ (including all operations, such as hash
computation and queue search). For each simulation setting,
we perform 5 randomly seeded experiments of 2 min and
average over these 5 runs. The bold values in Table. II are
the default ones used in our simulation. For example, N is
the parameter we examine in Fig.1a, with the rest of the
parameters having the default values: Prcheck = 0.2, α = 5,
τ = 5 ms and γ = 10 Hz. The default values of τ and γ are
typical values based on the literature (e.g., [3], [4]).
Simulation Results: Fig. 1a shows the waiting time CDF as
a function ofN . We also evaluate the baseline scheme forN =
15: maximum sustainable neighbor size (with such queue) is
around 20, as only 200 msg/s can be verified with τ = 5
ms. Fig. 1a shows the baseline scheme (N = 15) performs
similarly to our scheme with N = 20. In addition, around
90% of the messages have waiting times less than 0.3 s with
N = 40, 45, which is a significant improvement considering
the queue would not even be stable for the baseline scheme.
Fig. 1b illustrates waiting times for the default setting over
the simulation time. We see spikes, but overall, waiting times
are stable and do not increase as simulated time progresses.
In Fig. 1c, we see that as the number of neighbors increases
(thus, higher message reception rate), more messages need
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Fig. 1: (a) Waiting time CDF as a function of N . (b) Waiting time as simulated time progresses. (Default setting) (c) Cooperative
message verification ratio as a function of N .
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Waiting Time (s)
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
Empirical CDF
 
 
α=3
α=4
α=5
α=6
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Waiting Time (s)
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
Empirical CDF
 
 
Pr
check=0.2
Pr
check=0.4
Pr
check=0.6
(b)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Waiting Time (s)
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
Empirical CDF
 
 
τ=3 ms
τ=5 ms
τ=7 ms
(c)
Fig. 2: Waiting time CDF as a function of (a) α, (b) Prcheck, and (c) τ .
to be verified based on the peer-provided verification results.
This implies a higher risk of accepting bogus messages in
a malicious environment. However, on the other hand, the
probability of revealing (thus revoking) malicious nodes also
increases as the neighbor density increases (Sec. III).
We evaluate the waiting time for different α values (Fig. 2a).
We discover a threshold for α, above which peer-provided
verification results cannot help: with α = 7, the waiting time
CDF almost overlaps with that for α = 6. However, we
can expect a higher threshold for α with larger N . Prcheck
has an impact on the probability of bogus message (thus,
malicious node) detection and the waiting time distribution:
more signatures need to be verified for higher Prcheck. As
shown in Fig. 2b, almost 80% of the messages have waiting
times less than 0.8 s even with Prcheck = 0.6. Under this
setting, there is even a high probability that malicious nodes
can be detected locally/independently, since more than half
of the messages are checked. Fig. 2c shows the impact of
message verification delay on waiting time. In our simulation,
we found with τ = 8 ms, the queue is not stable anymore
and the queue size goes to infinity. However, it is already a
significant improvement considering only around 15 neighbors
can be sustained for the baseline scheme with τ = 7 ms.
We do not consider deadlines for CAMs here, but we can
infer those; e.g., for the default setting, with a 0.1 s deadline,
we can expect more than 90% of the received CAMs to be
verified (Fig. 1a). Again, this would not have been possible for
the baseline scheme, which can sustain around 20 neighbors
in the same setting.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated how our cooperative message verification
scheme could enable secure VC at network densities even
double compared to those prior approaches could be workable
for. Though this is achieved by trading off a tiny vulnerability
window, we showed this can be harmless. In addition, our
scheme is orthogonal to all prior optimizations and could
complement them.
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